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Abstract
This article analyzes how an accelerated public opinion formation process
took place in Spain, how this was reflected in various areas (the media, social
manifestations, opinion polls and election results), and the extent to which it
was aided by the development of the new communication technologies which
allow greater public access to information, a wider range and variety of sour-
ces and the rapid spread of information and opinion amongst a public organi-
zed into networks.
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1. Introduction
On March 11, 2004, Spain suffered the most savage terrorist attack in its
history: 192 dead, more than 1,500 injured, and a state of shock that affected
the whole country and had profound international repercussions. Public opin-
ion very quickly began to ask questions about the unknown factors surround-
ing the terrorist attacks, trying to find rapid answers because of the proximi-
ty of the general elections of March 14. In all the main representations of
Spanish public opinion (the mass media, opinion polls, public demonstra-
tions, etc), an intense debate took place over who was responsible for the
attacks. This debate had an impact, although it is difficult to say how great,
on the result of the General Elections of March 14, the purist and most impor-
tant expression of public opinion. The nature of this debate was clearly gov-
erned by two main determining factors:
- Two information strategies: Starting on the very same day as the
attacks, once early data began to cast doubts in one sector of public opinion
that ETA was responsible, a position which the Government strongly defend-
ed, and suggested that possibly Islamic terrorists were involved, public were
bombarded with information and disinformation provided, to a greater or less-
er extent, by practically all the participants in the process (the Government,
the political parties, the national and foreign media, the secret services, the
general public and even the terrorist groups themselves), in an attempt to clar-
ify who was responsible for the attacks. Such a clarification would obviously
influence the election result. If the attacks were the work of ETA, the public
could point to the success of the antiterrorist policies of the PP Government,
and give it their support. At the same time, they could vote against the prin-
cipal opposition party, the PSOE, because of the pacts they had made within
the regional Government of Catalonia with a separatist party, Esquerra
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), the leader of which had admitted a few
weeks earlier to having held talks with the Basque terrorist group ETA.
However, if the attacks were the work of Al Qaeda, the PP Government might
receive a punishment vote because of its strong support of the US/UK led
invasion of Iraq in 2003, which, according to public opinion, would have pro-
vided a motive for an Islamic terrorist attack.
- Over-information of the public: The consumption of the mass media in
Spain rose dramatically, as did that of the media which might be describe as
being “outside the mainstream media”, such as the thematic television chan-
nels, the foreign media (mainly in digital form) and an undetermined number
of channels of communication available on the Internet. Finally, an unusual-
ly high volume of traffic was noted in the area of technologically mediated
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Thursday March 11
- 7.37: First attack on the commuter trains, which connect Madrid to the suburbs.
Within the space of a very few minutes there are explosions in three more trains.
- 9.30: Juan José Ibarretxe, President of the regional Government of the Basque
Country, appears before the media to read a strongly worded communiqué against
ETA.
- 10.30: Arnaldo Otegui, leader of Batasuna, the political wing of ETA, denies that
this terrorist group is behind the attacks.
- During the morning of 11 March, the President of the Government, José María
Aznar, summons the directors of the main Spanish newspapers to claim that ETA
is behind the attacks. These newspapers quickly bring out a special edition blam-
ing, in some cases (such as El País) the attacks on ETA.
- 13.31: Ángel Acebes, minister of the Interior, singles out ETA as being responsi-
ble for the attacks.
- 14.40: Appearance of José María Aznar, in which he cites no specific terrorist
group.
- 17.25: The Foreign Minister, Ana Palacio, orders the Spanish ambassadors to
defend the hypothesis that ETA is responsible and also orders Inocencio Arias,
ambassador to the UN, to blame ETA for the attacks in his appearance before the
UN Security Council.
- José María Aznar holds a second round of talks with the editors of the Spanish
press, at which he reiterates that he is absolutely sure that ETA is behind the
attacks.
- 20.20: Ángel Acebes informs the media that a van has been discovered in Alcalá
de Henares (Madrid) with seven detonators and a tape containing verses of the
Koran in Arabic inside. However, he states that ETA “is, at the moment, the main
line of investigation”.
- 20.30: King Juan Carlos I appears before the cameras. Like Aznar, he talks only
of “terrorists” without naming any specific group.
- 22.00: The Cadena SER radio station announces that “three distinct sources from
within the antiterrorist forces” have told this radio station that a suicide bomber
had taken part in the attacks (although no proof was ever found). This obviously
adds weight to the Islamic hypothesis.
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interpersonal communications, especially the Internet (via e-mail, chats and
forums) and mobile telephones.
Taking into account the above, the chronology of events can be summa-
rized as follows1:
Zer english edition, 1, 2007, p. 89-118
Friday March 12
- 11.30: Second appearance of José María Aznar, in which he reiterates that ETA
is the most likely hypothesis, but “no line of investigation has been abandoned”.
- Throughout the day, various political opposition leaders begin to accuse the
Government of a lack of transparency and manipulation of the news.
- 18.00: The public television channel of the Basque Country (ETB) broadcasts a
brief telephone communiqué from ETA denying any participation in the attacks.
- 18.40: Ángel Acebes refutes the credibility of ETA’s statement: “We do not
believe them”.
- 19.00: Anti terrorism demonstrations take place all over Spain, involving a mas-
sive twelve million people (of a total population of 40 million).
Saturday March 13
- The La Vanguardia newspaper publishes a story explaining that the police inves-
tigation points towards Al Qaeda, and that there is “certain unease” within the
Spanish security forces with regard to the Government’s information policy.
- 14.30: Ángel Acebes: The investigation “progresses in both the established direc-
tions”, but ETA is the “priority”.
- 15.05: Just as Acebes finishes his appearance, the Cadena SER announces that,
according to its sources, the National Intelligence Centre (Spanish secret services)
have abandoned the ETA hypothesis and are working almost exclusively in the
direction of Islamic terrorism.
- 16.30: Jorge Dezcallar, director of the National Intelligence Centre, denies the
information given by Cadena SER.
- 18.00: An increasing number of people (around 5,000), summoned by SMS mes-
sages, gather in front of the PP headquarters in Madrid to protest against the con-
cealment of information about the responsibility for the attacks. Within a few
hours, this phenomenon is repeated in many Spanish cities. The demonstrations go
on until after midnight.
- 20.10: Ángel Acebes announces the detention of five people (three Moroccans
and two Indians) suspected of being involved in 11th March attacks.
- 21.00: Mariano Rajoy, presidential candidate of PP, calls a press conference to
denounce the public demonstrations in front of offices of the PP as illegal.
- 21.30: Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, spokesperson for the PSOE, accuses the
Government of hiding information: “the Spanish people deserve a Government
that doesn’t lie to them”.
Sunday March 14
- 00.45: Ángel Acebes announces the discovery of a videotape in which a man,
claiming to be a military spokesperson for Al Qaeda in Europe, claims responsibil-
ity for the attacks.
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- During the morning, the PP candidate, Mariano Rajoy, and the president of the
Government, José María Aznar, are insulted by bystanders as they are on their way
to vote. Others, however, shout encouragement.
- 20.00: Strong rise in turnout for the elections, 75’7%, seven points higher than
the 2000 general elections.
- 22.00: PSOE wins the elections with 42% of the votes, five points more than
the PP.
As can be seen from the above, the development of events leads to a con-
tinuous weakening in the position of the Government, at first determined to
defend the position that ETA was responsible but later forced to a first quali-
fy, and finally abandon, this position as the information and opinions broad-
cast by some of the media, political leaders and the general public, as well as
the data provided by the Government itself, undermined the original hypoth-
esis.
2. The media
Within a very brief time scale, the public felt impelled to consume and
digest large quantities of news, in order to form an opinion on who was
responsible for the attacks, and, in many cases, extract the political conse-
quences. Although we are not always able to work with totally reliable data,
we can make an initial study of the consumption of media at various levels,
which, together with the more concrete data (television and digital media)
covers not only the period of March 11, 12, 13 and 14 but also the correspon-
ding days of the previous week (March 4, 5, 6 and 7). Thus, we can offer a
more complete picture of the consumption of information and the influence
of the March 11 attacks on this consumption in the various media.
2.1. Mass media
The audience studies of the mass media in Spain currently tend to cover a
period of several months, as is the case of the Estudio General de Medios
(EGM) for the early part of 2004. The EGM shows a moderate rise in the con-
sumption of the press, which varies between 4% (El Periódico) and 10%
(ABC and La Vanguardia). The rise is significantly greater where radio is con-
cerned (24.1% higher in the Cadena COPE, 18.1% in Onda Cero, and 16% in
Cadena SER). Whilst the rise affects all the radio stations in general, it also
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News
Broadcast March 4 March 5 March 6 March 7
Telediario 1
(TVE)
3,220,000
(25.7%)
3,057,000
(24.5%)
3,195,000
(25.7%)
3,287,000
(27.5%)
Telediario 2
(TVE)
3,800,000
(25.3%)
3,558,000
(25.9%)
3,005,000
(23.8%)
4,092,000
(25.2%)
Antena 3
Noticias – 1
2,630,000
(21.1%)
2,727,000
(21.8%)
3,508,000
(28.2%)
2,865,000
(24%)
Antena 3
Noticias – 2
3.179,000
(22.8%)
3,338,000
(25.1%)
2,340,000
(19.1%)
2,820,000
(18.1%)
Informativos
Telecinco 1
2,535,000
(21.1%)
2,481,000
(20.7%)
2,284,000
(19.7%)
2,313,000
(20.8%)
Informativos
Telecinco 2
2,270,000
(17.8%)
2,225,000
(18.5%)
2,170,000
(19.1%)
2,993,000
(21.1%)
Table 1: Audience figures for TV news broadcasts from March 4 to March 7.
Source: Sofres.
94 Guillermo LÓPEZ GARCÍA
helps to consolidate the predominance of Cadena SER (with 5,702,000 listen-
ers compared with 2,551,000 for Onda Cero and 1,972,000 for Cadena
COPE), the most important station openly critical of the PP Government.
Although this data can in no way be applied to the period analyzed here
(from March 11 to 14, 2004), it would appear that the need to acquire infor-
mation quickly diminished public reliance on the press (whose digital ver-
sions, however, generally unaffected by the time constraints of the paper edi-
tions, showed a substantial increase in audience), whilst increasing public
consumption of radio, which, thanks to its immediacy (it offers the public
access to the latest news almost instantaneously, even more quickly and with
more flexibility than television) and wide availability make it an ideal medi-
um for mass consumption contexts such as the one we are dealing with, given
that it can be complemented by any other of the media, and is available virtu-
ally anywhere).
In the case of television, we have access to concrete data, which show a
notably greater consumption than normal:
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News
Broadcast March 11 March 12 March 13 March 14
Telediario 1
(TVE)
4,857,000
(35.1%)
4,385,000
(32.9%)
4,003,000
(29%)
3,659,000
(28.8%)
Telediario 2
(TVE)
3,977,000
(22.2%)
4,738,000
(28.6%)
4,072,000
(27.2%)
5,151,000
(28.9%)
Antena 3
Noticias – 1
3,386,000
(23.4%)
2,799,000
(20.4%)
3,776,000
(26.7%)
3,177,000
(24.9%)
Antena 3
Noticias – 2
3,406,000
(21.7%)
3,530,000
(22.8%)
3,020,000
(21.1%)
2,774,000
(17.2%)
Informativos
Telecinco 1
2,669,000
(18.8%)
2,846,000
(21.4%)
3,094,000
(23.2%)
2,949,000
(24.4%)
Informativos
Telecinco 2 -
2,220,000
(13.8%)
2,968,000
(22.4%)
2,821,000
(18.8%)
Table 2: Audience figures for TV news broadcasts from March 11 to March 14.
Source: Sofres.
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As can be seen there was a considerable rise in audience figures compared
to those of the previous week. If we add that, as well as the normal news bul-
letins, all the channels broadcast news flashes and a series of special pro-
grams about the attacks, the public demonstrations of March 12 and the elec-
tion results, all of which had high audience figures, we can conclude that
there was considerable public interest in acquiring information.
The audience concentrated mainly on the news broadcasts of the publicly
owned television company, TVE (as usually happens with major news stories),
although a slow decline in this leading position can be observed from March
11 until Election Day onMarch 14. The privately owned channel Tele 5 (whose
news programs tended to be critical of the PPGovernment), however, show the
inverse process to that of TVE, a gradual rise in audience for its news broad-
casts, and even the highest audience figures –by a narrow margin– of all the
TV companies in their Election Special broadcasts on the night of March 14.
Finally, throughout this period, and on March 11 in particular, the Internet
showed a considerable rise in news traffic, probably higher than that of any
of the other media.
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Media March 4 March 5 March 6 March 7
ABC 91.616 76.195 51.507 58.715
El Mundo 1.173.088 1.036.220 697.402 766.793
El Periódico 128.304 113.356 80.798 103.006
Avui 10.715 12.392 9.292 9.644
Diario de Cádiz 11.462 11.684 9.896 11.217
El Correo 53.268 50.873 30.510 31.933
El Norte de Castilla 16.135 15.407 9.478 9.714
Heraldo de Aragón 15.737 9.895 7.118 8.781
La Voz de Galicia 41.527 40.170 24.777 26.788
Levante – EMV 7.516 7.011 4.710 5.546
Libertad Digital 45.554 27.902 26.027 28.342
Vilaweb 56.858 45.027 28.282 29.922
Antena 3 TV 37.420 31.710 27.620 32.589
Cadena SER 73.910 72.565 59.967 67.679
Table 3: Digital media audience figures from March 4 to March 7.
Source: OJD.
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A study of the mass media in Internet depends largely on the data provid-
ed by the OJD (Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión). Unfortunately, the
OJD has no data for some of the most important digital media (El País Digital
and La Vanguardia), and so this study is limited to the main papers for which
we have data (ABC, El Mundo, El Periódico), as well as some of the particu-
larly influential regional titles (Avui, Diario de Cádiz, El Correo, El Norte de
Castilla, Heraldo de Aragón, La Voz de Galicia and Levante-EMV) and the
data for Libertad Digital (the most important of exclusively digital papers
–with no printed version– in terms of audience), Vilaweb (the largest digital
medium in Catalan), Antena 3 TV and the Cadena SER, the most important
Spanish radio channel which was crucially important in broadcasting infor-
mation about the unknown factors regarding the responsibility for the attacks.
Compare the figures for individual visits between the dates of our study and
the equivalent days of the previous week:
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Media March 11 March 12 March 13 March 14
ABC 379,450 296,223 202,106 225,242
El Mundo 3,010,535 2,616,505 1,710,159 2,169,994
El Periódico 265,665 256,126 180,636 241,666
Avui 45,572 23,578 28,486 29,722
Diario de Cádiz 25,268 20,966 15,894 14,727
El Correo 218,322 153,514 70,766 69,769
El Norte de Castilla 27,719 25,333 19,327 15,342
Heraldo de Aragón 36,161 29,958 15,877 17,735
La Voz de Galicia 104,446 95,833 49,882 64,664
Levante – EMV 13,044 11,965 8,891 9,353
Libertad Digital 105,673 91,227 59,004 77,641
Vilaweb 93,831 88,440 65,897 67,375
Antena 3 TV 80,237 70,805 29,001 45,465
Cadena SER 453,539 234,033 216,251 231,574
Table 4: Digital media audience figures from March 11 to March 14.
Source: OJD.
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In virtually all cases, we observe a huge rise in audience figures on March
11 (several times higher than those of the previous week) concentrated on the
most important media. This rise in audience figures tends to diminish after
March 12, although the figures are always much higher than normal. In other
words, the Internet users turn to the mass media for information about the
attacks themselves, but less so in the following days, when the focus of the
news shifts towards who was responsible for the attacks.
2.2. Alternative sources to the mass media
As well as a considerable increase in consumption of the mass media, the
public made use of other sources, such as blogs, contra-information sites, bul-
letin boards, etc. which spread information obtained not only from the
Spanish mass media, but also from other, less publicly visible, media (e.g. the
international press), and which became spaces for discussion, allowing the
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public to exchange views, that finally contributed to the accelerated formation
of opinion and the subsequent political implications.
The main function of these types of media at this time were a) select and
reproduce the most relevant information concerning the responsibility for the
attacks which had previously appeared in the mass media; b) interpret the
movements of the various social actors with regard to the attacks and the
responsibility for them; c) generate a multidirectional flow of information and
opinions among the readers; d) contribute to the process of formation of opin-
ion. Moreover even if we admit that these sites were clearly partisan in many
cases (Sampedro and López, 2005: 130-131), probably more so regarding the
participation than in reading articles and messages in the debates, it is fairly
easy to observe the plurality of points of view, and the change in direction of
the majority opinion.
Especially interesting is a study of the technologically mediated forms of
interpersonal communication. Here we can more clearly observe the interac-
tion of the public with the information, the way they briefly became “sec-
ondary sources”, reproducing and distributing all kinds of information about
the attacks and exchanging opinions, in particular, with regard to the respon-
sibility for them (Sádaba and Roig, 2004: 207). Unfortunately, it is too com-
plex a job to make even a minimally reliable record of these forms of inter-
personal communication. Even in the case of the bulletin boards, which,
because they are public and because the postings can be recorded on the
Internet for posterity, are the easiest form of interpersonal communications to
study, the problems involved in making a minimally representative analysis
are numerous: many bulletin boards erase postings from their databases a few
days after publication; many others, either because they are of minority
groups or of too specific nature, have too infrequent postings to be taken into
account in this research (even though they show a substantial rise throughout
the period analyzed). Finally, the publication systems of bulletin boards are so
extremely varied, that for our analysis we have opted to set some very gener-
al parameters from which we can make comparisons.
Therefore, we shall remove specific audience data, replacing them with
the number of daily postings, and then dividing these into two: the first figure
being the number of initial messages of new threads, the second being the
total number of postings (including the initial messages). Within these basic
parameters, the data in the following tables2 are taken from five bulletin
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Forum March 4 March 5 March 6 March 7
Areópago 21/256 17/183 3/30 7/35
Terra.es:
Actualidad Nacional 108/375 79/338 47/238 42/197
El Mundo: Política 2/8 5/19 1/1 2/4
Ya.com: Elecciones 267/587 267/499 204/488 200/334
Iblnews 80/201 66/314 58/251 44/269
Source: The Author.
Table 5: Messages in bulletin boards from March 4 to March 7.
Forum March 11 March 12 March 13 March 14
Areópago 48/302 48/259 63/352 58/315
Terra.es:
Actualidad Nacional 217/653 282/848 526/1,706 557/1,797
El Mundo: Política 10/45 15/78 19/125 16/109
Ya.com: Elecciones 513/1,313 467/1,374 1.091/2,669 2.389/4,938
Foro Iblnews 234/1,423 236/1,283 332/2,182 289/1,974
Table 6: Messages in bulletin boards from March 4 to March 7.
Source: The Author.
3. http://www.terra.es/actualidad/foro/portada.cfm?idforo 136&nivel 1
4. http://foros.ya.com/SForums2/ D readforum F 52628 O 0
5. http://www.elmundo.es/cobranded/forolibre/forolibre.html
6. http://www.revistadebolsa.com/foros/foro.php3?BoardID 2
7. http://iblnews.com/foros
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boards, which, in turn can be subdivided into: a) General portals (the
“Actualidad Nacional” forum from Terra.es3 and the “Elecciones Generales”
forum on Ya.com.4); b) Digital newspapers (the “Política” forum on
Elmundo.es5, the only one with a sufficient frequency of postings); and c)
Alternative news portals (the“Areópago” forum from La Página Definitiva6
and “El Debate”, from the news portal Iblnews)7.
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8. It needs to be pointed out that in one case –the “Elecciones Generales” forum on Ya.com-
the rise in postings can be attributed to the specific theme of this forum, and is not only due to
the consequences of the attacks themselves and the discussion about the responsibility for them
(after all it!s precisely the “Elecciones Generales” forum which shows the largest rise, of all
those analyzed, as election day approaches).
100 Guillermo LÓPEZ GARCÍA
In common with the other communication models previously analyzed, in
the bulletin boards there was also a rise, in this case in the number of mes-
sages posted, following the attacks, which in some cases was double the nor-
mal number. The number of postings after March 11, however, far from
decreasing over time, actually increased8.
In other words, while the public at first preferred the mass media to any of
the digital media (as their prime interest was in obtaining quick and reliable
information about the attacks themselves), from the moment the discussion of
who had been responsible displaced the attacks as the centre of attention, the
public not only tended to seek more disperse sources of information, but also
showed an enormous interest in discussion, the exchange of ideas and opin-
ions with regard to a theme which had become clearly crucial: the responsi-
bility for the attacks.
In this context, the public, sufficiently supplied with information from var-
ious sources, begin first to discuss, often in an extraordinarily heated context,
and, finally, to take part in a collective process of formation of opinion
(Sierra, 2004: 111). The themes of debate in the bulletin boards, normally
very wide-ranging, concentrated almost exclusively on the attacks and the
responsibility for them. Only on March 14, and even then in a way closely
related to the attacks, did the public begin to analyze the election results.
The styles of argument vary according to the type of forum (generally
much angrier and less informative in the more popular bulletin boards on the
general portals), but a similar trajectory can be observed in all cases, and
clearly demonstrates that, at least in this area, the formation of opinion took
place extremely quickly:
- Obviously, in the early moments the public, stunned by the magnitude
of the attacks, describes its mutual state of shock and strives to exchan-
ge data about the number of victims and the explosions themselves.
- However, later in the morning of March 11, after the statement of
Arnaldo Otegui (spokesperson for Batasuna) denying the implication
of the terrorist group ETA in the attacks, the first doubts begin to appe-
ar. Although the majority of participants in the bulletin boards accept
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9. According to our data, the message with the largest number of replies and readings, of
those analysed, was the one entitled “ETA atenta en Madrid”, published in the “Elecciones
Generales” forum of Ya.com on the morning of 11th March and which showed no less than 200
replies and a total of 4,804 readings.
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the Government line and tend to agree with the hypothesis that ETA is
responsible9, some people begin to suggest that the attacks were the
work of Islamic terrorism.
- Also on the morning of March 11, the first political consequences of
the attacks begin to emerge. At first, these assume that ETA is respon-
sible, and presuppose a weakening in the position of the PSOE and the
nationalist parties. The forum users who are openly supporters of these
parties take little part, but when they do, it is to urge people not to
change their intended vote, as this would be “letting yourselves be
influenced by the terrorists”.
- However, in the same way that high-speed political interpretations
appear in favor of the PP when the ETA hypothesis seems highly pro-
bable, from the moment in which data becomes available which might
call into question this hypothesis, political judgments, also on occa-
sions very vehement, emerge against the Government. In particular,
the evening appearance of the Minister of the Interior, Ángel Acebes,
in which he announced the discovery of a van in which had been found
seven detonators and a tape containing verses of the Koran in Arabic,
becomes the crucial moment in which the opinion of the participants
in the bulletin boards begins to change. Hence, on the very same day,
we find a direct association between the attacks (in this case attributed
to Al Qaeda) and the support of the PP Government for the military
intervention in Iraq, and constant criticisms, in particular, directed
against the president José María Aznar.
- At any given moment, the information supplied by the various media
(including some unconfirmed or even clearly false information) has
immediate repercussions in the bulletin boards, and is used to provide
support to the hypotheses favored by one side or another. The very
anonymity permitted by the majority of the bulletin boards gives rise
to an infinite number of abuses in the treatment of the information and
in the publication of opinions, both in the form (in many cases openly
insulting towards ideological rivals) and in the content (there is often
lack of journalistic rigor not only in the opinions but also in the publi-
cation of information, often false or distorted, about the attacks).
However, it is worth mentioning here that the main goal of the vast
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majority of participants in the bulletin boards is not just the search for
reliable information but also the interpretation of this information
according to the political sympathies of the participants.
- On March 12 the discussions continue, increasingly favoring the
hypothesis of Al Qaeda, and particular emphasis is given to the alle-
ged concealment of information by the Government. The question of
the responsibility is foremost in the discussions, with a profusion of
data and opinions, and speculation about the election results, which
now appear to be unfavorable for the PP (even by those participants
who favor this party).
- On March 13 the conviction that Al Qaeda is behind the attacks is
widespread, and is supported by three factors: a) the revelations of the
Cadena SER made in the early afternoon to the effect that the Centro
Nacional de Inteligencia, has abandoned the ETA hypothesis, denied
shortly afterwards by the director of the CNI; b) the apparent manipu-
lation of the news by the Government, reported by an appreciable
number of participants; and c) the revelations made by Ángel Acebes
during the evening of March 13 (the detention of various Moroccan
and Indian citizens) and in the early morning of March 13 to14 (the
discovery of a video in which an alleged spokesperson for Al Qaeda
assumes responsibility for the attacks), which seems to verify the said
hypothesis.
- Due to the events described above, a large number of the participants,
envisage a weakening of the PP in the elections of the following day,
and even predict a victory for the PSOE. The demonstrations in front
of the offices of the PP which took place in the late evening of March
13 are strongly criticized by many of the participants (especially those
who identify themselves as PP voters), but are also seen by many
others (in this case voters of the PSOE or the minority parties) as a
clear symptom of what we might call the “disclosure of fraudulent
information” supposedly practiced by the Government during this
period.
- Finally, March 14 saw the coming of age of a tendency, still in its
infancy on previous days, to use the bulletin boards as propaganda spa-
ces. The calls to vote, and to vote for a particular party (or even, to vote
against certain political options) are constant. Speculations on the
election results (generally seen as detrimental to the PP) also abound.
From the moment the PSOE victory is officially announced, two oppo-
sing interpretations of the results appear which are still being argued
months later: one interpretation being “a victory over the manipulation
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of news” which the Government had theoretically tried, and the other
being “a victory for the Al Qaeda terrorists”.
3. Public demonstrations
The public opinion formation process developed throughout these four
days, especially in the area of public demonstrations, and it developed in var-
ious ways, for different reasons, with different objectives in mind and, final-
ly, even following clearly different concepts of the structure of society. Here
we will provide a general overview of the main demonstrations that took
place during this period, placing special emphasis on organized versus unor-
ganized demonstrations. This study does not aim to be exhaustive but merely
to illustrate the main general models of behavior.
3.1. Organized demonstrations
Here we refer to the gigantic demonstrations which, with the slogan “For
the victims. For the Constitution. For the defeat of terrorism”, took place on
Friday March 12 in a host of cities and towns all over the country and
involved a massive twelve million people. These demonstrations were the
result of a totally centralized convocation by the Government (without the
prior agreement of the political opposition) on the same day as the attacks, a
convocation that was propagated at high speed via the mass media. This is,
therefore, a hierarchic model of convocation, carefully organized as a civic
response to the brutal attacks of March 11.
Inevitably, one must make a political interpretation of these demonstra-
tions, particularly of the slogan chosen for them. The allusion to the Spanish
Constitution cannot be considered gratuitous. It is clearly linked to one of the
central themes of the electoral campaign of the Partido Popular, and with one
of its most solid and most reiterated principles (the defense of Spanish
Constitution against its enemies, real or imaginary), and implies the censure
of all those political parties and social groups in favor of modifying the
Constitution (particularly the nationalist parties). Moreover, this slogan helps
to give credit to the Government’s hypothesis that ETA is behind the attacks10.
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However, as soon as the public demonstrations begin, the slogan, decided
on a few hours after the attacks, appears questionable in the eyes of the polit-
ical opposition and a part of the general public, who are beginning to ques-
tion not only if the attacks were carried out by Islamic terrorism (in which
case the allusion to the Constitution would be senseless), but also whether the
Government is trying to divert attention away from this possibility by some
obscure information strategy (of which the demonstrations of March 12 were
a part) which some people even label as deliberate manipulation. In other
words, the slogan of the demonstration is read not as a confirmation of the
responsibility of ETA, from which the public would extract the appropriate
political consequences, but as yet another attempt to avoid the danger that the
public might extract other political consequences, detrimental to the
Government, related to a different kind of terrorism, Islamic terrorism (i.e. the
idea that the attacks took place as a consequence of Spain’s support for the
invasion and occupation of Iraq the previous year), with which would tragi-
cally close the circle of the, also, massive demonstrations against this support
which took place in Spain in 2003.
Hence, as a consequence of public suspicion of Government’s information
policy, of the state of political nervousness experienced after attacks and two
days before the elections of March 14 and of the idea (maybe not yet a major-
ity idea, but fairly strong amongst the public) that the responsibility for the
attacks can be attributed to Islamic terrorism, the demonstrations take on a
significance to the main one of the rejection of terrorism. This added signifi-
cance is extremely negative for the Government, which receives (directly in
the Madrid demonstration, indirectly in many others) the message “before
voting we want the truth” and other similar messages. The Government’s
communication strategy, regardless of how intentional this is perceived to be,
works against them: as Umberto Eco correctly pointed out (2004), the mes-
sage that the Government sends to the general public is not so much “we are
sure it was ETA”, but “we are afraid it might have been Al Qaeda”.
This idea, very widely circulated via interpersonal communication, diffi-
cult to detect by the mass media, but at the same time feeding on material pro-
vided by the same mass media, very quickly becomes established in the gen-
eral public and has political effects on the elections which, though difficult to
identify exactly, have obvious consequences: the loss of the Government by
the Partido Popular. It also gave rise to the appearance of a surprising and
highly controversial phenomenon: the mass protests of March 13 in front of
the offices of the PP.
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3.2. Unorganized demonstrations
We consider “unorganized public demonstrations” to be those that occur
without the intervention of a recognizable, centralized convoking body (i.e. a
specific public institution, public organization, or group of organizations)
(Durandin, 1995: 229-230). Although, even today, there are many suspicions
as to the origin of this convocation, it would appear excessively hazardous to
lay the blame on any political party or particular organization, and in any case
it appears unquestionable that, regardless of who was responsible for the con-
vocation (the author of the SMS message which started the chain), not only
did this message spread in a decentralized, unsystematic and uncontrollable
way by means of a whole host of interpersonal communications, in particular
those needing technological mediation, that is email and SMS messages on
mobile telephones, but also these technologies allowed the original message
to spread much more quickly and to reach many more people from much
more diverse backgrounds than cases in which interpersonal communication
is restricted to traditional versions (face to face communication and, at most,
that produced in telephone conversations) (Sampedro, Alcalde, and Sádaba,
2005: 258; Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Linchuan, and Sey, 2006: 311).
Neither must we ignore the enormous importance of the mass media in
divulging and reinforcing (voluntarily or not) these demonstrations, simply
by making them visible to the general public, and also that of political lead-
ers, such as Mariano Rajoy or Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, who appeared before
the media as a result of the demonstrations. The immediate effect of the com-
bined action of political representatives, interpersonal communication and the
mass media was to increase the overall dimensions of the demonstrations, in
a kind of mirror effect in which the information broadcast by the media and
the political declarations were later transmitted through the interpersonal
communication channels, causing an increase in the number of demonstrators
for a period of several hours and, at the same time, extending their presence
in the mass media, as a major focus of news.
These concentrations have their origin in a traditional mechanism of mobi-
lizing public opinion, the rumor, used throughout history as a means of protest
against various forms of power (Monzón, 1992: 182). It would be extraordi-
narily enlightening at this point to make a brief mention of the work of
Tamotsu Shibutani (1966), which studies the origin of rumors as a search for
stability: when there is a lack of information, the people invent the news.
According to Shibutani, the rumor is “a form of communication adopted
when a group of people find themselves in an ambiguous situation and
attempt to construct an acceptable interpretation of this situation, using the
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available intellectual resources (…) it pays little attention, therefore, to the
problems of distortion which occur in a serial transmission, but rather to the
social interaction which takes place between people caught in inadequately
defined situations. In order to act intelligently these people seek news and the
rumor is, above all, a type of news“ (1966: 17).
Why do these protest demonstrations happen? Fundamentally, because of
a crisis of credibility in the Government, whose handling of the news is seen
by the public as a deliberate manipulation, designed to avoid defeat in the
general elections (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Linchuan, and Sey, 2006:
315). What in another context might be interpreted merely as involuntary
errors of communication, a few days before a general election becomes a con-
scious attempt of manipulation: the Government is trying to get to election
day maintaining at all costs the hypothesis that ETA is behind the attacks,
which is beneficial to them, and the protests emerge as a product of this
rumor, to prevent the Government attaining the objective of its hypothetical
manipulation (a victory in the elections). As Shibutani suggests: “The rumor
is a substitute for news. In fact it is news which does not pass through insti-
tutionalized channels (…) but emerges from a discrepancy between the infor-
mation which is deemed to be necessary and that which is available (…) Far
from being an pathological circumstance of the individual, it forms part of
peoples’ attempts to find solutions to the demands of their lives” (1966: 62).
Faced with unsatisfactory information, the public generates counter infor-
mation (Gerstlé, 2004: 233). Part of the public, suspicious of the
Government’s intentions in advancing the ETA hypothesis as the most likely,
unable to satisfy their need to acquire information from that offered by the
mass media, which, at first, logically tends to follow the Government hypoth-
esis, begins to give much weight to information that allows them to doubt this
hypothesis, information not necessarily obtained from the mass media. As
Dader points out: “Collective anxiety or uncertainty when faced with a situa-
tion which is confused or dramatic for the majority of people, brings into play
improvised channels of communication, which may even substitute the offi-
cial or habitual channels, such as the ‘mass media’” (1992: 265).
Furthermore, the rumor spreads with unusual power and speed, making
full use of the information transmitting potential offered by the communica-
tion networks (not in vain, according to Shibutani, when collective excite-
ment is intense, the speed of construction of the rumor is only limited by the
physical access to the channels of communication through which it flows),
and emanating from a model of society, the “network society”, which is
organized very differently to traditional societies: overcoming (at least par-
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tially) the obstacles of time and space, the spread of information in many
directions (and also by the public use of interpersonal communications), occa-
sional changes in the traditional relationships within the social surroundings
of the individual, etc.
The call to protest, born of and organized via technologically mediated
interpersonal communication, and made more powerful by the mass media
and the presence of various social actors (especially political leaders), passes
through several stages of development:
- Before the time announced for the demonstration in front of PP head-
quarters in Madrid (it is important to highlight that the original gathe-
ring was only called in Madrid), its circulation is widened by a call to
action emanating from certain counter information websites, which
also help to spread the effect throughout the country by arranging
similar gatherings in the main Spanish cities, as well as the extension
of the original message (protests in front of the PP headquarters in
Madrid) to include other cities (greatly helped by the fact that the pla-
ces chosen for the demonstrations are not certain streets or emblema-
tic places which would need to be specified for each town but simply
the local PP offices).
- From the moment the demonstration in front of PP headquarters in
Madrid begins, the mass media contribute, voluntarily or involuntarily,
to widen the impact of the demonstrations, both in numerical and geo-
graphical terms. At first, only two Spanish television channels, the
Catalan TV3 (which covers only some of the Catalan speaking areas
of the country) and the thematic channel CNN report the Madrid pro-
test. The general television companies ignore it. However, foreign
televisions show much greater interest: Euronews, BBC News, CNN
International provide live coverage of the demonstration (although the
Spanish media could have avoided broadcasting this kind of action for
fear of contravening electoral law, this would obviously not affect the
foreign media). As far as radio is concerned, the attention given to the
Madrid protest is also uneven, the Cadena SER again leading the way.
Finally, in the case of the digital media we find early references to the
protests in various models of communication. Hence, there is a spread
of the demonstrations brought about by the mass media, in combina-
tion with the original protest calls made via interpersonal communica-
tion systems. (CaWada, 2004).
- Thirdly the protests grow in size, duration and location, due to the
appearance of an unexpected and probably involuntary figure:
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CIS PP 42.2% (176 seats) PSOE 35.5% (131 seats)
La Razón PP 43% (171–176 seats) PSOE 37% (135-141 seats)
ABC PP 41.3% (170-174 seats) PSOE 37.4% (131-135 seats)
El Periódico PP 42.5% (169-173 seats) PSOE 37.3% (135-140 seats)
El Mundo PP 42.1% (168-173 seats) PSOE 37.6% (138-144 seats)
El País PP 42% (168-172 seats) PSOE 38% (134-141 seats)
La Vanguardia PP 41.4% (162-167 seats) PSOE 39.2% (143-147 seats)
Cadena Ser PP 40.5% (161-166 seats) PSOE 38% (140-145 seats)
Table 7: Pre-electoral opinion polls.
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Mariano Rajoy, the PP’s leading general election candidate, who
comes before the media at 9.00 pm (all the evening news programs
show this appearance) as General Secretary of the PP, to ask the peo-
ple protesting in front of the headquarters of the PP in Madrid (and
also beginning to congregate in other Spanish cities) to refrain from
doing so. The effect obtained is exactly the opposite for three reasons:
a) the appearance makes the demonstrations “official” in the eyes of
both the public and the mass media; b) it paves the way for the appe-
arance, at 9.30 pm, of Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, spokesman for the
PSOE, who, in front of the mass media, directly accuses the
Government of withholding information; c) it generates an effect con-
trary to the desired one in those more ready to a accept as true the
hypothetical “manipulation of the news” by the PP and probably inci-
tes them to join, or at least support, the protest demonstrations.
- From this moment on, the demonstrations develop in all the most
important centers of population, in an unusual imitation of the massi-
ve demonstrations of the previous day. The figures are by no means
comparable (the largest demonstration, in Barcelona, involved fewer
than 10,000 people), but then neither are the birth of the demonstra-
tions, nor the circumstances in which they took place. It is extraordi-
narily difficult to draw conclusions about the effects of the demonstra-
tions on the intention to vote of the following day, as these appear con-
tradictory although pointing towards a change of the vote in one sense
or another.
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Table 8: Polls taken outside polling stations.
Tele 5 PP 169 seats PSOE 141 seats
Antena 3 PP 153-161 seats PSOE 152-159 seats
Cadena SER PP 154-160 seats PSOE 151-159 seats
TVE PP 150-154 seats PSOE 154-158 seats
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4. Opinion polls and election results
The various opinion polls published before March 11 were unanimous in
forecasting a PP victory in the elections, although there was ample discrepan-
cy in just how large this victory would be:
The results of these opinion polls left no room for doubt: the PPwould win
the elections with a difference of between 13 and 45 seats (between 1.3% and
7.5% of the votes). These polls merely corroborated the general feeling, held
by the mass media, the public and the political parties themselves, that the
elections, unlike the 2000 elections, were decisive. It was not so much a case
of who would win the elections (the PP), but whether they would do so with
or without an absolute majority.
The polls corroborated this feeling but with nuances. Although they sug-
gested a probable victory for the PP, most of them agreed that this would be
a victory without an absolute majority (176 seats), even more so as election
day approached (the most favorable poll for the PP, the one organized by the
Centro de Investigaciones sociológicas , CIS, was published a week before
the others). Furthermore, in some cases (the polls held by Cadena SER and
La Vanguardia) the indications suggested a draw rather than a narrow victo-
ry for the PP.
We should not try to extrapolate consequences from the figures published
in opinion polls, but neither should they be ignored. The polls for the pre-elec-
tion period before 11th March did, indeed, forecast a PP victory but also clear-
ly showed that the PP were highly unlikely to repeat their absolute majority
of 2000. All the polls showed a narrowing of the gap between the PP and the
PSOE compared to a starting point that was much more favorable to the PP,
and the minor discrepancies of degree between polls did nothing but confirm
the probability of a result where neither side would obtain the required 176
seats.
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Although there is still no clear tendency, a comparison between these data
and those of the polls taken on Election Day outside the polling stations, may
help us to shed a little light on the impact of the March 11 attacks on the elec-
tion results:
As can be seen, the more or less clear PP victory forecast by the pre-elec-
toral polls is reduced to a virtual draw (slightly favorable for the PP in two
polls, and for the PSOE in another). There is just one startling exception: the
poll conducted by Demoscopia for Tele 5, which showed results very similar
to those forecast in the pre-electoral polls. What was the reason for the distor-
tion between the Demoscopia poll and the others? Precisely because, due to
the negative experiences of using polls taken outside the polling stations in
previous elections, Demoscopia had decided to substitute them with a pre-
election poll of similar characteristics to those to those shown in Table 11, but
with the advantage of working with data much closer in time to election day...
and the tremendous disadvantage of having collected this data before March
11.
Although this data should be viewed with caution, it would appear that the
events of March 11 had a beneficial effect, although hard to quantify, on the
electoral hopes of the PSOE in two ways: on the one hand, the increase in
turnout, and on the other, the appearance of the famous socialist “hidden
vote”, converted into an “anti-Aznar vote”.
The turnout figure of 75.7% was much higher than that of the 2000 elec-
tion (68.7%) and similar to that of the 1996 election (77.4%). Such a high par-
ticipation favored the PSOE because traditionally in Spain the communities,
provinces and townships where the PP tends to win the majority of the votes
have higher turnouts than those where the left win the elections. Moreover the
PP voters and tend to be more disciplined, voting systematically, whether the
elections are decisive or not in contrast to what happens in the strongholds of
the parties of the left, whose voters are traditionally less liable to turn out than
the those of the PP and tend to abstain except when the situation is deemed to
be crucial.
This phenomenon can be seen in the analysis of the turnout data for the
autonomous communities, which show a rise in turnout compared to the 2000
elections of 12% in Catalonia and 11.2% in the Basque country (communities
where the PSOE won by a wide margin), for example, compared to 5.2% in
Castilla – León and 6% in Galicia (mainly PP areas). It can also generally be
seen when studying data for the electoral districts and municipalities that tra-
ditionally favor one party or another. In 2000 those areas (particularly in the
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12. The post-electoral poll of the CIS in March-April 2004 shows 10.6% of those questioned
claimed to have decided their vote after the attacks of March 11; in answer to more specific
questions, 9.4% of the PSOE voters, but only 1.5% of PP voters, say they voted for these
parties “because of the attacks of March 11th and the consequences thereof”.
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large cities) where the PP won the elections usually showed higher than aver-
age turnout figures, in a context in which the general turnout figure was very
low. Neighborhoods such as Salamanca or Retiro in Madrid, Sarrià in
Barcelona, Pla del Real in Valencia or Triana in Seville, or provincial capitals
such as Murcia, Vitoria or Salamanca are a proof of this. However, the left
wing areas, as well as an almost systematically lower turnout than the PP
strongholds, also showed a higher than average increase in abstention. This
happened, for example, in Puente Vallecas (Madrid), Ciutat Vella (Barcelona),
Este (Sevilla) or Poblats Oest (Valencia), and in municipalities such as Santa
Coloma de Gramenet, L’Hospitalet de Llobregat or SanlYcar de Barrameda
(López, 2004). In the 1996 and 2004 elections, on the other hand, both of
which had high turnouts, the rise in these areas is inverted: although the
absolute data are still generally higher in the PP strongholds, the rise is much
smaller than in the traditionally left wing municipalities and neighborhoods11.
What is the reason for this increase in turnout, particularly amongst the left
wing public? Moreover, to what extent is it a result of the attacks and the way
they were reported by the media, the political maneuvering and the participa-
tion of the public in the demonstrations? Again, there is no clear answer.
However, we can suggest the following:
1) The attacks had a powerful influence on the turnout at the elections, on
those people, regardless of their political tendencies, who were going to
abstain but who finally decided to vote. This increase in turnout, which we
cannot quantify (although it seems clear that without the attacks the turnout
would have been lower, but still higher than in 2000, as the pre-election polls
suggest), favored, as we have explained, left parties12.
2) The increase in participation could well be attributed to the participa-
tion in the elections of the new voters, and the young voters in general, a par-
ticipation that was generally against the PP, as had clearly been seen in the
antiwar demonstrations of 2003, and again in the demonstrations of March 12
and 13.
3) In addition to the attacks themselves, the way the Government managed
the crisis was, in the eyes of a large part of the general public, a compendium
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of all the worst facets of four years of a PP Government holding an absolute
majority (Romero, 2004): authoritarian and with a monopoly of the truth, the
hypothetical manipulation of the news, and the surprising pro-American
change in foreign policy which led the PP Government to give its uncondi-
tional support to the invasion of Iraq in March-April 2003, despite the fact
that the majority of public feeling (around 90%, according to the polls) was
against such a measure.
So, given that election campaigns are fundamentally a tool to capture votes
on election day (votes which are usually more or less decided before the elec-
tion campaign begins), it was the attacks and, above all, the Government’s
handling of them, persuaded a large part of the general public to vote, or
change their vote, at the last minute to what was effectively an “Anti-Aznar
vote”. Hence, those who were going to abstain voted PSOE, PP voters
abstained or voted for other parties (we should keep into consideration that
although the turnout rose by 7%, the PP lost more than half a million votes),
and the voters of the other parties (particularly the small nationalist parties)
gave their support to the PSOE, not so that the PSOE would win the elections,
but rather to prevent the PP winning, i.e. to punish the PP and particularly
José María Aznar.
5. Active public, multiple sources
The society that witnessed the stupefying events of March 11 has evolved
considerably compared to the traditional model of a passive public crowding
around a few mass media. The public is no longer content merely to receive
its information from a closed list of sources, and hence works to find more
credible news sources (not necessarily part of the mass media). The mass
media themselves have also evolved thanks, above all, to the development of
the new technologies in digital format.
If we study the means of obtaining information available to the Spanish
public in 1997, just ten years ago, (a limited number of large television chan-
nels, radio stations and printed publications), it is surprising to see just how
far they have advanced since then:
- As well as the traditional television stations, the public has been able
to access a whole range of thematic television channels, both national
and international, delivered via cable or satellite television. There has
also been an uncontrollable rise in the number of local television sta-
tions, specially enhanced by the recent development of Digital
Terrestrial Television (DTT) in Spain.
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- To rival the large national newspapers and the local dailies, a new type
of free press (almost unknown ten years ago) has appeared which, in a
relatively short time, has achieved a privileged position in readership
figures, putting in danger both the influence and the advertising reve-
nue of the commercial newspapers and, by virtue of their being free,
widening their potential audience to include a sector of public that, tra-
ditionally, had shunned the news in printed form.
- Moreover, all these media have developed digital versions on the
Internet to a greater or lesser extent (press more than radio and radio
more than television), which, although it might be said that, to date,
they have yet to adapt satisfactorily to the rules (and possibilities) of
the new medium (Díaz Noci and Salaverría, 2003), does make the
information available on the mass media available to new sectors of
the public.
- However, as well as reproducing, and even extending, the more tradi-
tional media, the Internet has spawned a wide range of exclusively
digital media, some forming part of the traditional mass media and
other being totally dissociated from them, but all combining to create
a new and infinitely richer public space on the Net alone, than that
offered by all the more traditional mass media.
- Finally, Internet, and other digital technologies, have made possible
powerful and rapid systems which reproduce in one way or another
interpersonal communication: as well as “face to face” communication
and its telephonic analogy, it is now possible to establish interpersonal
communication systems both on the Internet (public and private chats,
bulletin boards, emails, etc) and by other means, particularly the sys-
tems of communication made available by the mobile telephone.
In crisis contexts such as the one following the March 11 attacks, where
the public obtains information from a wide variety of sources, many of which
are not part of the traditional mass media, technologically mediated interper-
sonal communication provides enormous powers of mobilization. The expe-
rience of March 11 and the events thereafter point us towards a model, devel-
oped in the sixties, the “diffusion in J of information” (Dader, 1992: 264-265).
This model becomes fully operational when dealing with “events of very high
general interest general and, at the same time, high personal implication”
(1992: 265), which paradoxically “imply a much more intense use of other
channels of information (…) different from the ‘mass media’. In the first
stages, at least, of such situations, the possibility of influencing the public or
of the direct impact of hypothetical acts of persuasion is much more viable
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using the media of interpersonal communication than using the mass media ”
(1992: 264). Although the consumption of mass media is considerably high-
er than normal, they are no longer the only possible source, nor even the main
one: the public complements the information offered by the mass media with
that obtained and interpreted from other sources, and from there establishes a
vigorous public debate in a context of networked society from which a major-
ity opinion emerges.
It could be argued, and rightly so, that, these new technologies do not real-
ly represent an increase in plurality of the mass media, the majority being
mere evolutions of media already in existence, but, even so, their importance
should not be ignored. However small the impact on public opinion of each
of these media might be, their sheer number, and their ability to form wider
communication structures, compensates for their small individual weight, and
they develop pluralism (Boix, 2002: 135) from a double perspective: quanti-
tatively and also transversally, in that the mass media are no longer the exclu-
sive occupants of the public space, and neither is this public space the same
one in which public opinion was traditionally formed (Sampedro, 2000: 42),
as it is much more global in character, with regard to the origins of the media
(this would explain, amongst other things, the development, in recent years,
of an emerging “international public opinion”, which was seen in action in
2003 against the invasion of Iraq).
6. Conclusions
Throughout this work, we have looked back on the behavior of the main
representatives of public opinion (the vote and the political parties, opinion
polls, the media and social demonstrations) in relation to an event of crucial
importance, the March 11 attacks, and what happened immediately after them
had a more or less clear effect on these representatives. From our analysis, we
will attempt to outline what March 11 implies in terms of changes in the
behavior and effectiveness of these representatives of public opinion and in
the process of forming public opinion itself:
Policonsumption of the media
In this context of a broad multiplicity of information sources, in the hands
of a public potentially well able to select their information, the major news
stories (such as 9/11, the invasion of Iraq and March 11 itself, made even
more important due to the election campaign) give rise to the proliferation of
the phenomenon of public policonsumption of media.
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A television zapping style culture, more extended where there is a greater
variety of media, allows part of the public to put together a personalized view
of the facts, instead of letting the mass media do it for them (Bennett,
Lawrence, & Livinsgton, 2007). This kind of public, with a higher than aver-
age interest in political affairs, well able to act as “leaders of opinion” in their
environment, and with healthy degree of general skepticism towards the mass
media, oppose the classical model of public which tends to accept as true the
information obtained via these media. However often the policonsumption of
the media might merely lead to the systematic reaffirmation of the readers’
original ideas, the greater availability of information, and the fact that the
public can choose from such wide range of sources, complementing their
information by means of the various forms of interpersonal communication,
allows us to discern a more plural, more diverse, and less hierarchical outlook
(Yildiz, 2003: 278), until now unheard of in the major events, like those
which interest us here.
Official summoning and spontaneous demonstrations
March 11th is also a landmark in the area of social demonstrations due to
the development of a virtually new phenomenon: the formation of flash mobs
(Rheingold, 2003), groups of protesters usually brought together by means of
various forms of interpersonal communication, in a decentralized and sponta-
neous manner. As we mentioned earlier, the flash mobs may be considered, to
a certain extent, to be an evolution of the rumor as a way of expressing pub-
lic opinion. Although the rumor is often open to various forms of manipula-
tion, and usually has little or no journalistic rigor, one must not underestimate
its value as a way of mobilizing public opinion, especially against the estab-
lishment. Throughout history, examples of how the rapid spread of rumors
may constitute an immediate prelude to a popular uprising, occasionally a
successful one, are plentiful.
The flash mobs, whilst obviously not identical, are similar in nature to the
rumor, but adapted to the social conditions in which they develop, i.e. using
the media in two ways; (both as an instrument of convocation, and as the main
channel used to publicize, either immediately or later on, their activities) and
forming part of a context of communication in networks. In the same way that
the demonstrations of March 12 are a product of the mass media (i.e. they are
summoned hierarchically, by centralized official channels), the flash mob is
the result of a convocation by means of networked communication media,
particularly those in the area of interpersonal communication.
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Accelerated process of public opinion
On March 14, three days after the attacks, the Spanish General elections,
with a high turnout, gave the PSOE a surprise victory. “Surprise” if we consid-
er the parameters before March 11, but perhaps less so after the events of the
following three days.Although the time lapse between the attacks and the elec-
tions was very short, the intensity of the experience, the proliferation of data
and public interest in knowing, interpreting and debating the facts and the
maturity of Spanish public opinion, shown the previous year after the emer-
gence of the antiwar movement, gave rise to an accelerated process of forma-
tion of public opinion; accelerated, because it took place at high speed, pass-
ing through all the phases of the process of formation of opinion (culminating
in the vote), in a kind of “race against time” in the period between the attacks
and the elections (Eco, 2004). Moreover, it was a process that shaped a still
latent public opinion, intrinsically different to the “traditional” one: a public
opinion governed at almost all stages by the rules and consequences of com-
munication in networks (Habermas, 1998: 440-441; Sampedro, 2000: 20).
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